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COMMERCIAL LAW
of the degree of evidence required to establish a loss by wind-
storm. The defense was based on the claim that the collapse of
-a roof was due to structural weakness. The court concluded
that the plaintiff had succeeded in showing that the windstorm
was the proximate or efficient cause of the loss, although struc-
tural weakness may have been a contributing factor. Perhaps
in most such cases the latter would be true, but as the trial court
remarked, a building can be insured even if it is improperly
constructed. This addresses itself to the matter of inspection
when the taking of the risk is under consideration.
CORPORATIONS
A. N. Yiannopoulos*
In the 1958-1959 term the Louisiana Supreme Court handed
down several decisions involving problems of corporation law,
such as authority of corporate officers, validity of sale of entire
corporate assets, illegal reduction of capital, and taxation of
foreign corporations doing business in Louisiana.
Authority of Corporate Officers
Friedman v. Noel Estate, Inc.,' involved the frequently de-
bated issue of authority vested in the president to bind his cor-
poration in contractual matters. The general rule is that the
president has very little authority by virtue of his office alone.
2
Corporate affairs are ordinarily managed by the board of di-
rectors and the president is merely the presiding officer of the
board.8 However, trying to cope with modern business practices,
the courts in several states have held that the president has, at
least prima facie, authority of a general manager to conduct
the ordinary business of the corporation. 4 In other states, where
the strict rule prevails, the courts have held that the president
may bind the corporation by reason of acquiescence of the direc-
tors in a known exercise or assumption of power. 5 This result
*Research Associate Professor, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. 236 La. 862, 109 So.2d 447 (1959).
2. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1945-1946 Term -
Business and Commercial Law, 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 165, 257 (1947).
3. See LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 228 (1959).
4. Id. at 228 et seq.
5. See 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 509 (1938).
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has been rationalized as estoppel or as exercise of ostensible au-
thority in accordance with well-settled agency principles. 6 i '
In the instant case, the president of a closely held corpora-
tion engaged exclusively in the business of leasing its real estate,
concluded an oral lease, the validity of which was disputed by
the corporation on the ground that the president had no au-
thority. According to the original articles of incorporation,: the
president was. given all the powers of the corporation without
necessity of authorization by the board of directors; by sub-
sequent amendment, however, the president was deprived of
the power to act "without the approval of the board" except
with regard to "administrative acts only." In spite of this ex-
press limitation, the Louisiana Supreme Court did not hesitate
to find that the president had authority to conclude the lease
in question. Relying on the fact that the sole business of the
corporation was the lease of its property, that all business trans-
:actions were invariably conducted by the president without
previous board action, and that the president of the corporation
was the only person dealing with and known to plaintiffs, the
court held that the corporation "by its action has indicated that
the 'administrative authority' reposing in its president is very
broad" and covered the transaction under consideration.
The case seems to rest on ostensible authority rather than
estoppel. The court indeed referred to the well-settled rule that
"when, in the usual course of the business of a corporation, an
officer has been allowed to manage its affairs, his authority to
represent the corporation may be implied from the manner in
which he has been permitted to transact its business." 7 The
real difficulty in the case was the limitation on the authority
of the president by the amended articles of incorporation.: Under
such circumstances it has been held elsewhere that the board
could not possibly delegate authority expressly or by acquies-
cence, nor could it ratify the unauthorized acts of the president.8
The result reached by the Louisiana Supreme Court, however,
is. sound. Unlike the corporation law of some states, persons
dealing with officers of a corporation in Louisiana are not
charged with constructive notice of the content of the articles
of incorporation.9 Further, in the instant case the corporation
.6.. f. Ideal Savings and Homestead Ass'n v. Kerner, 208 La. 513, 23 So.2d
200 (1945) ; 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 595 (1938).
7. 236 La. 862, 880, 109 So.2d 447, 453 (1959).
8. See 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 497 (1938).
9. See I*. R.S. 12:11 (1950).'
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was closely held; father, wife, son, and daughter were its share-
holders and officers. In case of such an "incorporated family
partnership," the assumption of powers by the president con-
trary to the articles of incorporation creates an appearance of
authority resting not only on the acquiescence of the directors,
but also on that of all, the shareholders.
Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Welsh10 involved the authority of
a corporate officer to receive payment by checks drawn in his
name rather than that of the corporation. Welsh, a consignment
distributor under contract with Esso, sent checks to Guibet,
credit manager of Esso, addressed to him personally though
with the understanding that the proceeds would be credited to
his running account with the corporation. Guibet gambled, and
lost a considerable amount of the money so received. Esso
brought action against Welsh for repayment, claiming that al-
tihough Welsh knew that the funds were misappropriated by
Guibet, he had failed to disclose the fact to the management, and
that the credit manager (Guibet) had no authority to receive.
payment in his own name. The Louisiana Supreme Court held
that Welsh had properly discharged his obligation, to the cor-
poration.
The decision is based on well-established agency principles.
As the court observed, "the rank and dignity of the position :of
plaintiff's credit manager" and the proved fact that "it was not
uncommon for customers to make payments by checks payable
to the credit manager" were sufficient to create an apparent
authority. Under the circumstances, an obligation could, be
validly discharged by payment to the agent."' Third persons,
in; absence of collusion, are not liable to the principal for the
agent's fraud.12 Mere subsequent knowledge of misappropria-
tion of funds paid to the agent on the principal's account may
thus be ,considered immaterial.
Sale of Entire Assets
Wainwright v. Lingle13 was a sequel to an earlier case in-
volving the same parties. In that case Wainwright had brought
suit against the Audubon Development Company, a Louisiana
10. 235 La. 593, 105 So.2d 233 (1958).
11. Cf. MECHEM, AGENCY § 949 (1914).
I2. ld  §§ 2135-37.
13. 236 La. 854, 109 So.2d 444 (1959).
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corporation, and one Lingle individually, for the delivery of fifty
shares of stock, or their value, in accordance with an alleged
subscription contract. 14 The Louisiana Supreme Court ordered
specific performance by the corporation, reserving to plaintiff
his rights against anyone in case delivery of the stock could
not be effected within a reasonable period of time. Plaintiff
Wainwright, apparently dissatisfied as the corporation was
under dissolution and without assets,15 brought a new action
against the corporation and the individual defendant seeking to
set aside on the ground of fraud a transaction whereby all cor-
porate assets were sold to Lingle, a director, at a price below
their actual market value; in the alternative, plaintiff prayed
for a money judgment in the value of his shares. The Louisiana
Supreme Court, following the opinion of the lower court, refused
to set aside the sale of assets as actual fraud had not been
proved and held that, in absence of fraud, the action was barred
by the ninety-day prescriptive period of Louisiana Business
Corporation Act, Section 41 E. With regard to the alternative
demand for a money judgment, the court fixed the measure of
damages in the value of plaintiff's shares on the day preceding
the transaction in question.
The case raises interesting questions involving the validity
of directors' contracts, sale of entire assets, the appraisal of the
value of shares, and the running of the ninety-day prescriptive
period of the Louisiana Business Corporation Act, Section 41.
Lingle was an organizer, shareholder, and director of the cor-
poration at the time of the allegedly fraudulent transaction. As
persons in his position may be tempted to take advantage of
their strategic situation, a body of law has been developed de-
signed to safeguard the interests of the corporation, its credi-
tors, and those of minority shareholders. Such law relates main-
ly to the validity of directors' contracts, compliance by the man-
agement with certain requisite formalities in case of sale of all
the corporate assets, and to remedies available to dissenting
shareholders. In accordance with a strict rule prevailing in
some jurisdictions, all contracts concluded between a director
and the corporation are voidable without regard to their fair-
ness, good faith of the parties, or other considerations. 16 Most
14. See Wainwright v. Lingle, 224 La. 702, 70 So.2d 594 (1954).
15.. Of. id. at 707, 70 So.2d at 596; Wainwright v. Lingle, 236 La. 854, 855,
109 So.2d 444, 445 (1959).




courts,: however, hold such a transaction valid if entirely fair
to the corporation and if the presence of the interested director
was not necessary to constitute a quorum nor his vote required
to carry the resolution. 7 Few courts went further and held
that presence and voting by an interested director will not
render the transaction voidable if otherwise entirely fair and
entered in good faith.'8 Proof of actual fraud is thus not neces-
sary.' 9 In Louisiana, the courts have in the past consistently
upheld the validity of directors' contracts provided that there
was an independent quorum and voting majority and the con-
tract was entirely fair and concluded in good faith.20 In the
instant case, the issue was not squarely raised.
With regard to the sale of the entire assets of a corporation,
the Louisiana Business Corporation Act, Section 41, requires
the observance of certain formalities. Where these formalities
are not observed, the sale of assets may be enjoined or set aside
by dissenting shareholders acting within ninety days from the
sale. In case of actual fraud, the rights of dissenting share-
holders under Section 41 are cumulative with other existing
forms of legal and equitable relief.21 In the instant case, as fraud
was not proved, plaintiff's action to set the sale aside could be
based only on the ground that the formalities prescribed by
Section 41 had not been complied with. The Louisiana Supreme
Court held that such action was barred by the ninety-day pre-
scriptive period of Section 41 E. It is not clear whether Section
41 E establishes a "prescription," subject to suspension and in-
terruption in case the dissenting shareholder is unable to bring
action within the ninety-day period or a "peremption" running
in any case without regard to personal circumstances. The court,
without discussing the nature of the limitation period, took the
view that the action should be barred in any case since it "was
filed neither within ninety days from the confecting of the sales
nor within ninety days after the finality of the judgment of this
court decreeing plaintiff to be a shareholder of the corporation."
As the court refused to set aside the sale of assets, it faced
the problem of measure of damages. The solution of the court
17. 3 PLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §§ 919, 930, 931 (1938); LATTIN, CORPORA-
TIONS 258 (1959) ; Comment, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 82, 86 (1949).
18. See 3 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 930 (1938).
19. See id. § 919. The burden of proof as to fairness rests in all cases on the
director. Id. at 916.
20. See Comment, 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 374 (1940).
21. See Bennett, Remodelling, Merger and Dissolution of Louisiana Corpora-
tions: A Critical Survey,.3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 481, 486 (1941).
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was to award plaintiff the fair cash value of his shares as. of,
the day preceding the sale. This measure applies, as the court:
properly observed, where a shareholder complies with the pro-,
visions of Louisiana Businss Corporation Act, Section 52. Plain-
tiff had not complied, nor could he be expected to comply as his!
status was disputed, and one may ask how this measure of dam-
ages could be justified in the instant case. The answer seems.
to be that in effect plaintiff was treated equally with other:non-
dissenting shareholders and received a proportionate amount of
the proceeds of the sale. The value of the shares on the day-
preceding the sale was found to be the same as the interest they'
represented in the assets of the corporation, appraised on thei
basis of the actual purchase price.
It is questionable whether under the circumstances the value!
of the shares as of the day preceding the sale of assets, or an'
equal participation with non-dissenting shareholders in the pro-
ceeds of the sale, is a sufficient remedy. During litigation
initiated for the clarification of a shareholder's status which!
may last for several years, the value of the assets involved may'
increase several times; moreover, plaintiff is deprived of the
use of his capital and of possible opportunities for profitable
investment. Thus, even where the management 'observed all
requisite formalities concerning the sale of the entire assets of
the corporation, some courts in appraising the value of dissent-
ing shareholders' shares took the view that such shareholders
should be given the "value of their investment" and interest up
to the date of payment.22 In case of sales confected without ob-
servance of statutory formalities, or in case of fraud, the meas-
ure of damages is frequently higher and punitive damages are,
not excluded.23 Unless such an approach be taken, a money judg-
ment may constitute an inadequate remedy under the circum-
stances.
The grounds of liability imposed on the individual defendant:
in solido with the corporation are not given in the opinion. The
purchaser of the entire corporate assets, whether another cor-
poration or an individual, does not carry any liability toward
creditors or dissenting shareholders except in case of fraud and
transfer without consideration.2 4 Thus, it is submitted that in
22. See LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 529 (1959).
23. See id. at 524.
24.' See 15 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §§ 7122-7125 (1938).;. Bennett, Remodel-
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accordance with the court's finding that no fraud was perpe-
trated and that the assets were sold at a fair price, Lingle should
be free of any liability to Wainwright. 25 If, on the other hand,
the liability of Lingle was predicated on the ground of fraud and
transfer without sufficient consideration, it seems the sale itself
should be set aside.
Reduction of Capital Stock
Sheffield v. Norris26 involved the validity of sale of the entire
corporate assets and direct distribution of the proceeds among
shareholders by reduction of capital stock. Mosquito Hawks,
Inc., was a closely held corporation organized to engage in the
pest control business; Sheffield, Norris, and their respective
wives were its only officers and shareholders. Within a year of
its creation, a unanimous decision was taken to discontinue the
venture and to sell all corporate assets at a private auction. In
a meeting arranged for that purpose, Norris offered to buy the
corporate assets for a stated price and Sheffield allegedly accept-
ed. To avoid a possible seizure of the proceeds by the regular
counsel of the corporation who had a claim for attorney's fees,
the following scheme was devised: Norris would transfer to the
corporation a block of shares as half payment of the purchase
price; Sheffield would also transfer to the corporation an equal
number of shares in order to take possession of the other half
of the purchase price directly from Norris. No formal instru-
ment was drawn with regard to the offer and acceptance since
a series of documents were contemplated to legalize the trans-
action: an offer to purchase, a resolution accepting the offer, an
act of sale, a charter amendment reducing the capital stock, and
two instruments designed to effect the transfer of stock to the
company. When these intruments were prepared, Norris re-
fused to sign and Sheffield brought action against Norris claim-
ing half of the purchase price as assignee of the corporation.
The court did not discuss exhaustively the problem whether
or not a contract had been concluded between Norris and Shef-
field. Assuming that the offer had been duly accepted, it re-
fused to grant the requested relief on the ground that the cor-
poration had no "legal title to transfer the claim to him [Shef-
ling, Merger and Dissolution of Louisiana Corporation: A Critical Survey, 3
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 481, 498 (1941).
25. Cf. 15 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 7125 (1938).
26. 235 La. 667, 105 So.2d 260 (1958).
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field]." "The validity of the assignment to plaintiff," the court
declared, "was dependent upon the legality of the corporate
amendment reducing the capital stock." But as the "mandatory"
provisions of Louisiana Business Corporation Act, Section 45,
had not been complied with, the attempted reduction of capital
stock was ineffective, and in turn, the assignment invalid.
The disposition of the issue by the Louisiana Supreme Court
is sound. Section 45 of the Louisiana Business Corporation Act
is designed to safeguard, among others, the interests of corporate
creditors by prohibiting the draining off of capital and its dis-
tribution among shareholders. Where the shareholders desire to
discontinue the venture, the law affords a well-devised proce-
dure for dissolution which safeguards the interests of all con-
cerned ;27 informal liquidation by direct distribution of all capi-
tal assets among shareholders should not be encouraged. The
fact that the corporation was closely held does not eliminate the
necessity for formal dissolution and cannot be an argument for a
more lenient judicial attitude as is the case with regard to cer-
tain informal business transactions of "incorporated partner-
ships." 28
Finally, it should be noted that not only the alleged assign-
ment but also the attempted sale itself was illegal and invalid.
Indeed, by making the entire transaction dependent on the
validity of the corporate amendment relating to the reduction of
capital, the court seemed to indicate that the corporation itself
could not under the circumstances hold Norris obligated under
his offer to purchase. The soundness of this approach may not
be questioned since, on the one hand, the offer had never been
formally accepted by board resolution, and on the other hand, it
was part of the entire scheme and contemplated transfer of
shares rather than cash payment. Sale of entire assets for shares
of another corporation, though closely scrutinized as covering a
possible merger or consolidation, 29 may in fact be a sale for a
sufficient consideration.80 Sale of the entire assets for shares of
the selling corporation is simply a direct transfer of all capital
to the "purchasing" shareholder without regard to the interests
27. See LA. R.S. 12:53-62 (1950). Cf. Munn v. Wadley, 192 La. 874, 189 So.
561 (1939).
28. Cf. Daly v. Opelousas Insurance Agency, 181 La. 89, 158 So. 631 (1934)
(upholding the validity of a transfer of all corporate assets authorized of informal
director's action).
. 29. See Bennett, Remodelling, Merger and Dissolution of Louisiana Corpora-
tions: A Critical Survey, 3 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 481, 498 (1941).
30. See LA. R.S. 12:41 (1950) ; 15 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 7127 (1938).
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of third parties. Dissenting shareholders and creditors would be
able under the circumstances to set the transfer aside or to hold
the purchaser liable.81
Taxation
In Union Producing Co. v. Martin,2 and three other consoli-
dated cases involving the identical legal issue,33 the court was
confronted with the problem of interpreting R.S. 47:2611.34 On
the basis of that section the Secretary of State argued that a for-
eign corporation must pay, on qualifying to do business in the
state, a tax of one-twentieth per centum upon the amount of cap-
ital stock initially employed here, the tax to be no less than ten
dollars nor more than two thousand five hundred dollars; and
that thereafter, it must pay a similar tax on any annual increase
over a preceding year's capital. Following "the usual methods
of statutory interpretation," the court considered several factors
such as the established practice of the tax collecting agencies, the
pre-history of the statute, and the probable consequences of all
possible interpretations. It appeared that the tax collecting au-
thorities had consistently interpreted the statute in the past as
creating the obligation to pay only once and for good up to the
maximum; and that the original Act 107 of 1922 stated plainly
that "the tax is for the admission of a foreign corporation to
do business in this state" and not for the privilege of continuing
operation after its admittance. 85 Finally, the court pointed out
that the interpretation pressed by the Secretary of State would
lead to inequitable results as it would offer an opportunity to
minimize tax burdens by staggering the introduction of capital
into the state. The court thus held that the assessment "was in-
tended to be a single tax levied for the privilege of a foreign cor-
31. CI. 15 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §§ 7163-64 (1938) ; Walter v. Gaffal, 192
La. 447, 188 So. 137 (1939) (transfer for the purpose of avoiding present indebt-
edness set aside).
32. 236 La. 1057, 110 So.2d 99 (1959).
33. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Martin, 236 La. 1071, 110 So.2d 104 (1959)
United Gas Pipeline Co. v. Martin, 236 La. 1070, 110 So.2d 103 (1959) ; United
Gas Corp. v. Martin, 236 La. 1069, 110 So.2d 103 (1959).
34. See LA. R.S. 47:2611 (1950): "Every foreign corporation, before being
authorized to do business in this state shall as a condition thereto, pay into the
state treasury a tax of one-twentieth (1/20) of one per centum (1%) upon the
amount of the capital stock of the corporation employed by it in this state, and
a like tax on any subsequent increase thereof, provided that no such tax on the
original capital or increases thereof shall be less than ten dollars, nor more than
two thousand five hundred dollars."
35. The court pointed out that where the legislature wanted to create an obli-
gation for annual payment, it did so expressly, as in the case of Act 8 of 1932,
LA. R.S. 47:601 (1950) (annual franchise tax in express language).
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poration's 'being admitted to do business in the state'; that the
amount thereof is determined by the capital employed in the
state, but is not to exceed $2,500; and that the required payments
on increases of capital stock were merely to prevent a corpora-
tion from entering with the minimum tax of $10 and thereafter




Payment of a negotiable instrument in due course by or on
behalf of the principal debtor is one of the means expressly enu-
merated in the negotiable instruments law of discharging the
instrument.' Under the statute payment is made in "due course"
when it is made "at or after maturity of the instrument to the
holder thereof in good faith and without notice that his title is
defective."'2 A payment before maturity to one not the "holder"
does not discharge the instrument. Payment even after maturity
to one not the holder is at the risk of the party making the pay-
ment.3 In: the application of these principles it is clear that the
burden of proof rests upon the party who pleads the defense of
payment to show by a preponderance of the evidence that pay-
ment of the instrument claimed to be discharged has been made
to one authorized to receive payment on behalf of the holder.4 It
is not incumbent upon the holder who sues on a note to prove
non-payment.
Egert v. Stassi5 was a case merely involving issues of fact in
the application of these principles. Plaintiff sued as the trans-
feree-holder of a note for $5,000.00 executed by defendant pay-
able to a corporation. Defendant pleaded payment on the day be-
fore maturity by a check payable to a New Orleans bank. Plain-
tiff denied that such payment was in satisfaction of the note or
that it had any connection with defendant's personal indebted-
1. La. R.S. 7:119(1) (1950).
2. La. R.S. 7:88 (1950).
3. See, for example, Henry Knight & Son, Inc. v. Shall, 9 La. App. 98, 119
So. 80 (1928) applying the well-settled rule that a person paying one not in
:possession of the note and without requiring its delivery up for cancellation acts
at his peril unless the person receiving payment has authority from the holder or
owner as his agent to receive payment thereof. Numerous cases applying these
principles are collected in BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (Beutel's
rev. 7th ed. 1948).
4. Orleans Discount Co. v. Derbes, 170 La. 660, 129 So. 121 (1930).
5. 237 La. .1070, 112 So.2d 715 (1959).
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